Risk Equity by Viscusi, W. Kip
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 The Journal of Legal Studies. 843 (2000)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/108
Citation: 29 J. Legal Stud. 843 2000 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu Aug 16 11:42:34 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0047-2530
Retrieved from DiscoverArchive, 
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository 
Originally published as W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity in 




Risk equity serves as the purported rationale for a wide range of inefficient policy
practices, such as the concern that hypothetical individual risks not be too great.
This paper proposes an alternative risk equity concept in terms of equitable trade-
offs rather than equity in risk levels. Equalizing the cost per life saved across policy
contexts will save additional lives and will give fair treatment to risks arising in a
variety of domains. Equitable trade-offs will also benefit minorities who currently
are disadvantaged by politically based inefficient policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE equity consequences of risk regulations have become a formal com-
ponent of governmental evaluations of risk and environmental policies. Pol-
icy concern with environmental justice and environmental equity is perhaps
the most visible manifestation of a concern with risk equity. In 1994 Presi-
dent Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12,898,1 which required agencies
to "identify and address . . . disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental impacts" on minority populations. In response to
this order, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency established a watch-
dog office within the agency, the Office of Environmental Equity, to moni-
tor the effects of environmental policies on equity concerns. These develop-
ments were also mirrored in the emergence of a large literature dealing with
environmental equity and related concerns.2
* John F. Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, Director of the Program on Empir-
ical Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. E-mail: kip@law.harvard.edu. Paper prepared for
the University of Chicago Law School Cost-Benefit Analysis conference, September 17-18,
1999. Helpful comments were provided by Matthew Adler, Eric Posner, Judge Richard
Posner, and conference participants.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
2 See, for example, Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001 (1993); Vicki
Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. Land Use & Envt'l L. 1 (1995);
Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Re-
port on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste
Sites (1987); James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collec-
tive Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 Rand J. Econ. 101 (1993); James T. Hamilton,
Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political Power? 14 J. Pol'y Analy-
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX (June 2000)]
© 2000 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/2000/2902-0012$01.50
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While environmental equity has been the most salient concern, a variety
of other forms of equity with respect to risk affect policies not only in the
environmental area but across other types of risk regulations. What we
mean by fair is more problematic and, in the extreme case, can lead to the
ad hoc justification of any specific policy intervention, however expensive
it might be. Is it, for example, fair to target a population group that has been
disadvantaged for reasons other than risk, such as poor education, and to
provide them with more protective risk regulations to compensate them for
their disadvantaged status? Or should we attempt to provide some kind of
equal protection irrespective of economic status, and, if so, what is it that
we mean by equitable protection against risk? Fairness has no well-defined
guidelines, and as a result, this article will explore a wide variety of poten-
tial fairness concepts, recognizing that there are quite diverse views as to
what does in fact constitute an equitable risk policy.
My concern with risk equity will not be from the standpoint of moral
criteria but rather social welfare maximization.3 In particular, the emphasis
is on decision procedures by government agencies, as these procedures
function in practice. In a more idealized political world in which there was
no use of equity concems to mask self-interested efforts to tilt policies away
from welfare-maximizing norms, the role of equity might be quite different.
Thus, a driving force of much of what follows is that purported equity con-
cers often serve as the rationale for justifying bad policies.
My most direct experience with such notions of equity came with respect
to the siting of the new landfill in Orange County, North Carolina, in the
early 1990s. The previous landfill site, which was becoming full, was lo-
cated in a rural area. To promote environmental equity, the policy decision
was made to site the new landfill in a manner that would not affect farm
uses in the rural areas of the county. The first recommended site was a tract
of as yet undeveloped land bordering what was one of the most affluent
suburban areas in Chapel Hill. This landfill site had the additional disadvan-
tage that it was less than 500 yards from my house. While the neighborhood
was successful in fighting this misguided notion of environmental equity,
the site the county chose instead was not superior from an efficient policy
standpoint. The county instead designated a section of the Duke Forest to
be used as the landfill. In what was surely an outrageous environmental out-
come, the county chose as its landfill site a pristine research forest and na-
ture preserve of the Duke University School of the Environment. The envi-
sis & Mgmt. 107 (1995); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Clarification in Environmental Equity:
How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 Fordham Urb. L. J. 633 (1994).
3 This distinction parallels that in the paper by Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Imple-
menting Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, in this issue, at 1105.
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ronmental equity in this case was achieved by imposing substantial losses
on an educational institution located in the neighboring Durham County and
that consequently did not have as much political clout within Orange
County as did the local farmers. In this instance, which is by no means
unique, environmental equity provided the vaguely defined rationale for a
thoroughly misguided and socially harmful policy driven by political inter-
ests.
The principal view I will advocate here is that risk equity concerns are
almost invariably harmful to public welfare. Within the highly charged po-
litical context of policy development, it is almost always possible to con-
ceive of some notion of risk equity to justify even the most inefficient pol-
icy interventions. The same kinds of problems are encountered in contexts
of traditional economic regulation as, for example, one could justify milk
price supports or other regulatory market distortions on the grounds that
they provide equitable benefits to the milk producers. All government poli-
cies involve transfers of various kinds, some of which may be monetary
and others of which may be in kind. Those who benefit invariably plead
that equity demands that they receive the policy benefits. Risk regulation
policies typically involve in-kind transfers, but they nevertheless raise the
specter of rent seeking and attendant inefficiencies that one encounters
whenever one departs from economic efficiency norms.
The particular equity reference point that I will advocate in Section II is
the outcomes achieved by efficient markets. In particular, the outcomes in
competitive market transactions involving risk will serve as the standard for
what I will consider to be an equitable risk. Because markets for risk do
not always exist, there are frequently regulatory interventions for which the
efficiency test is benefit-cost analysis. I will explore this concept and its
relationship to risk equity in Section III. What people mean by risk equity
typically is neither market based nor linked to benefit-cost analysis but
rather is linked to some other notion of what kinds of risks are fair and what
kinds of risks are not. Section IV examines many diverse concepts along
these lines and illustrates why departures from efficiency norms can lead to
wildly ill-conceived government policies.
II. THE MARKET REFERENCE POINT
The functioning of efficient markets involving risk establishes what I will
take as my reference point for equitable risks. Consider a market transaction
in which risk attributes of a product are bundled with other product charac-
teristics. Then if the consumer is willing to buy the product, the person's
willingness to pay for it necessarily exceeds the cost of the product, taking
into account all the effects of the product in terms of health and safety risks.
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Similarly, in the case of jobs, the wages that workers are paid will either
equal or exceed the amount that they require to bear the risk associated with
the job. These decisions by consumers and by firms in turn create incentives
for efficient levels of safety, the details of which have been explored else-
where.4 Because consumer and worker preferences in effect set the price of
safety in the market place, the level of product safety and job safety will
necessarily reflect these valuations, leading to an efficient level of risk.
Market outcomes have the additional feature that there is also a transfer
to compensate individuals for bearing the risk. Purchasers of less crash-
worthy cars pay a lower price for these products.' Houses located near
Superfund sites are priced lower than those in safer neighborhoods.6 A
substantial literature has documented the existence of compensating differ-
entials for job risks.7 Thus, a voluntary transaction necessarily improves the
welfare of all participants in the market transaction, making them better off
or indifferent with respect to their previous situation.
It is useful to link these market transactions to the basic principles of the
Coase Theorem. For job risks and product risks in these market contexts,
the individual bearing the risk must be compensated to incur the risk. For
pollution situations in which property rights are assigned to the polluter, the
outcome of Coasean bargains will provide for efficient levels of risk after
the pollution victims pay the polluter sufficiently to decrease pollution lev-
els.8 While efficient in terms of risk, such situations are not comparable to
my market ideal because they make the party bearing the risk worse off
because they do not have the property rights and must pay to avoid the risk.
A distinctive feature of market transactions is that people make decisions
reflective of their individual circumstances, and firms and other enterprises
engaged in market transactions likewise make decisions on the basis of their
See W. Kip Viscusi, Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance
(1979), for a more complete description of the functioning of markets for hazardous jobs.
' See Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, The Valuation of Risks to Life: Evidence
from the Market for Automobiles, 72 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 133 (1990); Mark Dreyfus & W.
Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and
Fuel Efficiency, 38 J. Law & Econ. 79 (1995).
6 Estimation of the value of life based on this relationship appears in Ted Gayer, James
T. Hamilton, & W. Kip Viscusi, Private Values of Risk Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites: Hous-
ing Market Evidence on Learning about Risk, Rev. Econ. & Stat. (in press, 2000). Vicki
Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal
Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 Ecology L. Q. 1 (1997), explores this relation-
ship and its effect on environmental justice.
7 For a review see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Cri-
tique, Am. L. & Econ. Rev. (in press, 2000).
8 Efficiency here is in terms of short-run efficiency in terms of pollution levels. Long-run
incentives to enter the polluting industry will be too great if polluters are paid to reduce
pollution.
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economic situation. The essential element of markets is that they permit
such heterogeneity to play an important economic role. Consider the case
of firms with differing costs of providing safety. It is extremely costly to
substantially reduce the risks in sawmills and for construction work,
whereas making the health and safety risks to investment bankers very
small is quite within the realm of economic feasibility. For any given price
of safety set through consumer or worker preferences, we will observe
higher risk levels at firms where safety is more costly to provide.
The risk heterogeneity of primary interest here is with respect to individ-
uals. Discussions of risk equity typically focus on equity in the risks across
people rather than equity in the risks across firms or other institutions. The
three principal sources of heterogeneity that will be reflected in market
transactions and that should be reflected to enhance economic efficiency are
heterogeneity in individual riskiness, heterogeneity in individual willing-
ness to incur risks, and differences in preferences for activities that pose
risks. The decentralized individual decisions in the marketplace permit each
of these sources of heterogeneity to be expressed in the market transaction
and to be reflected in ultimate risk compensation outcome.
Consider first heterogeneity in individual riskiness. Individuals' suscepti-
bilities to disease vary, as do their skills. Jobs that require heavy lifting, for
example, will be more likely to pose injury for those who lack physical
strength. Inspection of accident statistics suggests that there are many im-
portant personal characteristics that drive differences in accident rates.
Some of these differences are by gender. Men suffer higher death rates for
most causes of death, such as accidents and homicides, though women are
more susceptible to pneumonia and risks of diabetes.9 Age-related differ-
ences are consequential as well, as males aged 15-24 are particularly prone
to being killed in motor vehicle accidents, and the elderly are particularly
susceptible to deaths from falls.'0 Market outcomes exploit this heterogene-
ity in the riskiness across individuals by, for example, matching male work-
ers in their twenties to physically demanding and risky employment.
A second source of heterogeneity is with respect to people's willingness
to incur risk, in particular, their willingness to trade off money or other at-
tributes for increases in the probability of some adverse outcome. Individ-
ual utility functions for different health states can differ just as can tastes
for other goods. One of the most salient risk decisions people make is with
respect to cigarette smoking. Not surprisingly, cigarette smokers differ in
quite fundamental ways from nonsmokers. Consider the following results
See National Safety Council, Accident Facts, 1998 Edition 10 (1998).
'o Id. at 11-12.
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for males from Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi: I" "Compared to non-
smokers, male smokers are 16 percent less likely to wear their seatbelts,
five percent less likely to check their blood pressure, and nine percent less
likely to floss their teeth. They also are more likely to work on hazardous
jobs and, for any given level of job riskiness, are more likely to be injured
on these jobs. Moreover, they are more likely to be injured at home as
well, incurring roughly double the home accident rate of nonsmokers.
Quite simply, smokers are greater risk takers than are nonsmokers, and this
willingness to bear risk is manifested across a wide range of personal ac-
tivities."
A third source of heterogeneity is that people may have different prefer-
ences for activities or jobs associated with risks. Downhill skiing, driving
long distances for one's job, and eating red meat all pose various hazards,
but they also provide consumptive benefits wholly apart from the risk com-
ponent that makes these consumption activities attractive to those who en-
gage in them. Even in the case of cigarettes, which is perhaps the riskiest
product consumed on a large scale, there is substantial heterogeneity in
preferences. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for cigarettes typically
cluster in the range from -0.4 to -0.7, indicating a fairly steeply sloping
demand curve with some people willing to pay considerably more for ciga-
rettes than the market price. Steepness in the product demand curve indi-
cates substantial heterogeneity in the value consumers place on this product.
Differences in the valuation of the consumptive benefits of cigarettes in turn
will affect the amount of the health risk people are willing to incur in order
to derive the pleasures associated with smoking cigarettes.
The role of heterogeneity is also manifested in situations in which there
are differences in the risks that people take. A chief example is that of the
labor market, in which workers who have self-selected into very high risk
jobs have different attitudes toward risks in average risk jobs. For example,
estimates of the implicit values of life based on labor market choices by
Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen 2 focused on workers in comparatively
high risk jobs that posed an annual fatality risk of one chance in 1,000. The
implicit value of life for their sample was $1.0 million (1998:3 prices using
the gross domestic product deflator). My comparable estimates of the value
of life 3 for a broadly based sample in which workers faced an average risk
" Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors, 28 J. Drug Issues
645 (1998).
2 Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor
Market, in Household Production and Consumption (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed. 1976).
" W. Kip Viscusi, Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards, 60 Rev.
Econ. & Stat. 408 (1978); Viscusi, supra note 4.
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of death of one chance in 10,000 yielded estimates of the implicit value of
life of $4.9 million. As I have also shown,' 4 this heterogeneity across differ-
ent groups in the labor market can be estimated explicitly, with the expected
relationship that workers who gravitate to high-risk jobs exhibit lower val-
ues of life than those in comparatively less risky positions.
It is not appropriate to say these value-of-life numbers reflect monetary
amounts of compensation to incur risk, whereas individual utility is a more
fundamental concern. Value-of-life estimates are in fact reflections of indi-
vidual preferences, and hence utility. More specifically, the marginal rate
of trade-off between wages and fatality risk (that is, the value of life) equals
the difference between the utility of money when alive minus the utility of
money after death, where this difference is divided by the expected mar-
ginal utility of consumption. This division in effect normalizes the utility
differences across people to reflect the rate of trade-off within their prefer-
ence structure.
To focus not on trade-offs but on utility levels has no economic content
under standard expected utility theory models. Utility functions are unique
up to a positive linear transformation. The level of any person's utility can
be scaled up or down arbitrarily. We cannot make valid interpersonal com-
parisons of utility levels, but we can draw conclusions within individuals.
Moreover, greater risk-money trade-offs as reflected in a higher value of
life show that within that person's preference structure safety is more
highly valued. Social welfare functions could, of course, choose to weight
people's valuations differently. However, my principal theme will be that
greater attention to efficiency will foster greater equity than under the cur-
rent regime in which various equity concepts are avowed concerns.
Heterogeneity in the value of life is also manifested in the correlation
between the riskiness of individual jobs and the riskiness of one's other ac-
tivities. Hersch and Viscusi 15 found that people who smoke cigarettes and
who did not use seat belts while riding in cars exhibited lower implicit val-
ues of job injury than did their more safety-preferring counterparts. Evi-
dence by Viscusi and Hersch"6 indicated that this relationship was ex-
tremely powerful. Indeed, smokers' greater willingness to bear risk as well
as their greater riskiness for different activities leads them to accept ex-
'4 W. Kip Viscusi, Occupational Safety and Health Regulation: Its Impact and Policy Al-
ternatives, in 2 Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management (John P. Crecine ed.
1981).
"5 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in
Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 J. Human Resources 202 (1990).
6 W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers (Working paper,
Harvard Law Sch. 1999).
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tremely risky jobs for which their total risk compensation is less than what
nonsmokers receive for lower risks.
Other forms of heterogeneity in implicit values of life and injury are also
well documented. Chief among these is the effect of age. 7 Workers exposed
to risks on the job have different durations of life at risk, and, as one would
expect, the greater the length of life at risk the higher the required compen-
sation will be. Moreover, estimates for a number of data sets suggest that
the implicit rate of discount that workers have with respect to years of life
lost cannot be distinguished statistically from prevailing rates of interest.
Income levels are also consequential. Estimates of the income elasticity
of the implicit value of job injuries by Viscusi and William Evans 8 suggest
that the relationship is roughly proportional in much the same way as the
present value of lost earnings in a wrongful death suit increases proportion-
ally with one's income. Other personal characteristics, such as gender, also
seem to be closely related to the willingness to bear risks, although the fail-
ure of many studies to find compensating differentials for job risks faced
by female employees seems to be largely due to the failure of these earlier
studies to use gender-specific job risk data. As shown by Hersch,' 9 women
face nonfatal injury risks just below those of men and have similar wage-
risk trade-offs for injuries, but they are much less likely to be exposed to
fatality risks on the job.
The magnitude of the risk involved also is influential. From a theoretical
standpoint, as one's base risk changes, one's willingness to trade off money
against health risks is altered as the opportunity cost of financial resources
is reduced when the base-level mortality risk is higher. These base rate ef-
fects have been estimated explicitly by Viscusi and Evans,2" who also ex-
plore the role of the magnitude of risk change. The money-risk trade-off
rate is not a constant but in fact diminishes with the extent of the decline
in risk for willingness to pay and increases with the extent of the increase
in risk for the willingness to accept value.
All these different sources of heterogeneity have been documented em-
pirically and are a reflection of the kinds of flexibility afforded by market
outcomes. By matching individuals with risks suited to their preferences
" For estimates of the quantity-adjusted value of life, see Michael J. Moore & W. Kip
Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Econ. Inquiry 369 (1988), and a series of
sequels to this work, which are summarized in W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and
Private Responsibilities for Risk (1992).
"S W. Kip Viscusi & William N. Evans, Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status:
Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 353 (1990).
"9 Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job Injury Risks, 88 Am.
Econ. Rev. 598 (1998).
20 Viscusi & Evans, supra note 18.
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and capabilities, market outcomes exploit this heterogeneity in welfare that
would be suppressed under the alternative situation in which individuals
were constrained.
An immediate policy implication of this result beyond observing the ben-
efits of market transactions is that regulatory interventions through informa-
tional regulations such as hazard warnings have much to recommend them.
Such policies operate on a decentralized basis and, if the warnings efforts
are designed appropriately, can be very effective in making people knowl-
edgeable about risk and in assisting them in their discrete choices of risky
activities (that is, why they take a particular job or buy a product) as well
as with respect to the precautions they take within these particular activities
or product uses.2'
Consider the possibility of regulating asbestos exposure in the workplace.
One possibility is to issue a governmental regulation that limits asbestos
exposures in the workplace. Under that scenario, once firms comply with
the regulation, asbestos exposures will be reduced to a lower level, but there
will be no additional compensation to workers bearing the risk unless there
is awareness of the asbestos exposure. If there had been such awareness
previously, there would have been no need for the regulation since the mar-
ket processes would have generated efficient risk levels in the absence of
intervention.
An alternative to direct regulation of asbestos is to provide hazard warn-
ings to workers. Table 1 indicates the effect of asbestos warnings provided
to chemical workers who are told that asbestos would be the chemical with
which they now work and that this is a carcinogenic substance. Before
seeing the hazard warnings workers thought their annual risk of job injury
was 0.09, and rated on the same probability risk scale workers roughly tri-
pled their risk perceptions after receiving the asbestos warning. Some work-
ers would leave the job after being given the warning irrespective of the
wage rate they were paid, and two-thirds of them would quit if no wage
increase was forthcoming. Only a small fraction of the workers would be
willing to take the jobs again in the absence of a wage increase. Overall,
these workers exhibit an implicit value of job injuries of $27,846, where
this injury scale is with respect to nonfatal job injuries on the job and yields
estimates comparable to those found in other studies for nonfatal job risks.
What these results suggest is that the role of hazard warnings will lead
workers who are particularly unwilling to bear health risks to leave their
21 For evidence on the efficacy of hazard warnings policies and criteria for effective design
of such efforts, see W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Learning about Risk: Consumer
and Worker Responses to Hazard Information (1987); Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi,
Informational Approaches to Regulation (1992).
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TABLE 1
THE EFFECT OF HAZARD WARNINGS FOR ASBESTOS ON WORKER BEHAVIOR
Variable Mean Value
Initial risk assessment before seeing the asbestos warning (0-1 probabil-
ity scale) .09
Risk assessment after receiving the asbestos warning (0-1 probability
scale) .26
Workers refusing to stay on the job at any wage after receiving the warn-
ing (fraction) .11
Workers intending to quit if given no wage increase after receiving the
warning (fraction) .65
Workers who would take the job again if given no wage increase after
receiving the warning (fraction) .11
Additional wage premium for risk required (1995 $) 4,734
Implicit value of an injury (value per statistical injury) (1995 $) 27,846
SOURCE.-W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy 117 (1998).
jobs, while those who remain will generate compensating differentials that
will provide incentives for safety comparable to those for well-known non-
fatal job injury risks.
It is useful to compare the market outcome under informational regula-
tions with that achieved through regulatory standards. Each approach is suc-
cessful in generating an efficient level of safety assuming, of course, that
the risk communication effort is designed appropriately and leads to accu-
rate perception of the risk. However, under the hazard communication ap-
proach there is also compensation of the individuals who bear the risk,
whereas with regulatory standards in the absence of knowledge of the ex-
tent of the risk there will be no such compensation. Moreover, the informa-
tional approach provides for more efficient job matching by linking up
workers willing to bear the health risks with these jobs with remaining as-
bestos exposures, whereas regulatory standards in a market in which work-
ers are otherwise presumed to be ignorant will not have this effect. By
generating efficient risk levels coupled with compensation for risks, infor-
mational regulations yield the two principal benefits of perfectly function-
ing markets.
To say that informational efforts are potentially beneficial policy inter-
ventions does not imply that all warnings policies are desirable.22 Beneficial
information efforts should provide new and accurate risk information in a
convincing manner. Many informational efforts fall short on one or more
22 See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998), for a more detailed review of sound
warnings principles.
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dimensions. In some instances the apparent policy intent is not to inform
but to deter certain kinds of behavior. Policies of persuasion that attempt to
browbeat individuals into changing their behavior are often ineffective and
are almost invariably undesirable from a policy standpoint. Excessive warn-
ings stimulated by a desire to fend off liability burdens also may distort risk
comparisons across products.
Informational efforts also impose costs, particularly in terms of their cog-
nitive demands. As warnings efforts proliferate, problems of information
overload may develop. Even within a particular warning difficulties may
arise with respect to excessive information or label clutter. Warnings also
have important externalities, as they may lower people's perceptions of the
risks of products that did not receive a warning.
Warnings resulting from policy mandates have an additional potential
disadvantage in that they may displace private efforts. However, informa-
tional policies represent a policy area in which diversity is not always de-
sirable. Human hazard signal words such as "danger," "warning," and
"poison" ideally should have comparable meanings across different risk
contexts. Moreover, the most salient print size and the strongest warning
are not always desirable, notwithstanding the pressures of tort liability suits
to make warnings stronger. Excessive warnings distort across-product risk
comparisons. What is needed is a standardized hazard warnings vocabulary,
which in theory can result from governmental standards.
What these various caveats suggest is that while warnings policies can be
constructive, they can also be flawed. Establishing a potentially beneficial
governmental role provides no assurance that the actual intervention will
necessarily be welfare enhancing. As with regulatory policies generally, the
task is to design efforts that enhance efficiency.
III. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
The principal economic efficiency norm for policy evaluation is to apply
a benefit-cost test to policies. In particular, do the benefits of the policy to
society exceed the costs? These benefits are conventionally measured by
society's willingness to pay for the benefits, which in the case of risk reduc-
tion would be the willingness to pay for the small changes in risk resulting
from the governmental policy effort. Market outcomes that generate the
same risk levels as would benefit-cost analysis will differ in an important
way in that those bearing the risk will receive some form of compensation
in terms of higher wages or lower prices for the risk. In the situation of risk
regulation coupled with a complete lack of information regarding the risk,
there will be no associated compensation. The winners can only potentially
compensate the losers under a benefit-cost regime, but in practice compen-
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sation is not actually paid. This lack of compensation is a long-standing
issue that is prominent in critiques of benefit-cost analysis and whether it
is necessarily compelling as a policy assessment framework.
Benefit-cost analysis has played a prominent role in establishing criteria
for regulatory policies. Under Executive Order No. 12,291,23 President
Reagan mandated that agencies demonstrate that major regulations have
benefits in excess of their costs, where this requirement is monitored by the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Agencies are, however, not
bound by this benefit-cost test in instances in which there is a conflict with
the agency's legislative mandate, which is largely the norm among risk and
environmental regulation agencies. President Clinton continued this ap-
proach through his Executive Order No. 12,866,24 with the major change
being that it was recognized that not all benefits can be quantified in mone-
tary terms and that one should view benefits broadly to encompass all pol-
icy consequences of significance.
The experience under these benefit-cost regimes has been quite mixed
and does not seem qualitatively different from the outcomes in the Carter
administration, which did not have a benefit-cost test but instead quantified
benefits, costs, and cost-effectiveness. As I indicated,25 the OMB has never
been successful in blocking a regulation with a cost per life saved below
$142 million per life. This level is more than an order of magnitude greater
than what is sensible based on implicit values of life reflected in market
decisions. The result has been that many regulations promulgated have inor-
dinately large costs per life saved.
Table 2 summarizes the costs per life saved for regulations of different
regulatory agencies. Omitted from this group are governmental efforts that
do not require the promulgation of formal regulations, such as the hazard-
ous waste cleanup program known as the Superfund effort. This major pro-
gram by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) generates a median
cost per case of cancer across the cleanup sites of $6 billion per case, which
would put it among the most expensive items in Table 2.26
What one should use as a cutoff for the appropriate cost per life saved
depends on the methodological approach. Historically, government agen-
cies had used the present value of lost earnings as the value-of-life measure,
23 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
24 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
Viscusi, supra note 17.
26 The source of this estimate is James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks?
The Spatial and Political Dimensions of Hazardous Waste Policy (1999). Moreover, even this
estimate understates the actual cost per cancer case since many risk and exposure assump-
tions are unrealistic.
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or what agencies termed the "cost of death." In my 1982 analysis prepared
to settle the dispute between the OMB and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration over the proposed hazard communication regulation,
which had been appealed to then Vice President Bush, I introduced the
value-of-life methodology based on the willingness-to-pay estimates de-
rived from labor market behavior." Since that time, agencies have widely
adopted the value-of-life methodology, which has also been endorsed by
the OMB, but the particular estimate of the value of life used by the agen-
cies may differ. Most important, the value-of-life benefit estimate is not
binding on policy judgments because of the restrictive nature of agencies'
legislative mandates. Taking a $5 million value of life as a rough cutoff for
cost-effective policies, in Table 2 all policies above the 1984 benzene emis-
sion standard costing $4.1 million per life saved would pass a benefit-cost
requirement, and all policies beginning with the ethylene dibromide EPA
regulation in 1991 costing $6.8 million per life saved would fail a benefit-
cost test.
Asbestos is a particularly noteworthy target of regulatory action in that
it has been subject to increasingly inefficient regulations as public pressures
mounted in response to the wave of asbestos litigation stemming from ex-
posures in the shipyards in World War II and thereafter. The cost per life
saved for asbestos regulations rose from $9.9 million in 1972 to $88.1 mil-
lion in 1986, with an even more expensive EPA regulation in 1989 at
$131.8 million per case of cancer averted.
One quite reasonable notion of risk equity is that if society is homoge-
neous in its attitudes toward risk, then agencies should equalize the mar-
ginal cost per life saved across regulatory programs. Doing so will max-
imize the number of lives saved for any given cost amount. Table 2 presents
average costs per life saved rather than marginal costs per life saved. More-
over, in some cases the policy benefits occur in discrete jumps, such as the
deaths averted from aircraft floor emergency lighting, so that marginal
trade-offs are not pertinent. However, if society wishes to treat exposures
to risk equitably under the criteria specified above, it should attempt to
spend up to the same marginal cost-per-life-saved amount for different
agencies, where we abstract for the time being from the role of population
heterogeneity. Thus, a more meaningful and compelling risk equity concept
is to have equity in terms of the cost per life saved rather than equity in
terms of risk outcomes. Equitable trade-offs consequently become the refer-
ence point for risk equity measurement.
27 This analysis is discussed in Viscusi, supra note 17, and is based on W. Kip Viscusi,
Analysis of OMB and OSHA Evaluations of the Hazard Communication Proposal (report
prepared for Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan, March 15, 1982).
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REGULATORY COSTS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS IN SAVING LIVES
Cost per
Cost per Normalized
Life Saved Life Saved
(1990 (1995
Regulation Year Agency $Millions) $Millions)
Unvented space heater ban 1980 CPSC .1 .1
Aircraft cabin fire protection standard 1985 FAA .1 .1
Seat belt/air bag 1984 NHTSA .1 .1
Steering column protection standards 1967 NHTSA .1 .1
Underground construction standards 1989 OSHA .1 .1
Trihalomethane in drinking water 1979 EPA .2 .6
Aircraft seat cushion flammability 1984 FAA .5 .6
Alcohol and drug controls 1985 FRA .5 .6
Auto fuel system integrity 1975 NHTSA .5 .5
Auto wheel rim servicing 1984 OSHA .5 .6
Aircraft floor emergency lighting 1984 FAA .7 .9
Concrete and masonry construction 1988 OSHA .7 .9
Crane-suspended personnel platform 1988 OSHA .8 1.0
Passive restraints for trucks and buses 1989 NHTSA .8 .8
Auto side-impact standards 1990 NHTSA 1.0 1.0
Children's sleepwear flammability ban 1973 CPSC 1.0 1.2
Auto side-door supports 1970 NHTSA 1.0 1.0
Low-altitude windshear equipment and
training 1988 FAA 1.6 1.9
Metal mine electrical equipment stan-
dards 1970 MSHA 1.7 2.0
Trenching and excavation standards 1989 OSHA 1.8 2.2
Traffic alert and collision avoidance
systems 1988 FAA 1.8 2.2
Hazard communication standard 1983 OSHA 1.9 4.8
Trucks, buses, and MPV side-impact
standards 1989 NHTSA 2.6 2.6
Grain dust explosion prevention stan-
dards 1987 OSHA 3.3 4.0
Rear lap/shoulder belts for autos 1989 NHTSA 3.8 3.8
Standards for radionuclides in uranium
mines 1984 EPA 4.1 10.1
Benzene NESHAP (original: fugitive
emissions) 1984 EPA 4.1 10.1
Ethylene dibromide in drinking water 1991 EPA 6.8 17.0
Benzene NESHAP (revised: coke by-
products) 1988 EPA 7.3 18.1
Asbestos occupational exposure limit 1972 OSHA 9.9 24.7
Benzene occupational exposure limit 1987 OSHA 10.6 26.5
Electrical equipment in coal mines 1970 MSHA 11.1 13.3
Arsenic emission standards for glass
plants 1986 EPA 16.1 40.2
Ethylene oxide occupational exposure
limit 1984 OSHA 24.4 61.0
Arsenic/copper NESHAP 1986 EPA 27.4 68.4
Hazardous waste listing of petroleum-
refining sludge 1990 EPA 32.9 82.1





Life Saved Life Saved
(1990 (1995
Regulation Year Agency $Millions) $Millions)
Cover/move uranium mill tailings
(inactive sites) 1983 EPA 37.7 94.3
Benzene NESHAP (revised: transfer
operations) 1990 EPA 39.2 97.9
Cover/move uranium mill tailings
(active sites) 1983 EPA 53.6 133.8
Acrylonitrile occupational exposure limit 1978 OSHA 61.3 153.2
Coke ovens occupational exposure limit 1976 OSHA 75.6 188.9
Lockout/tag out 1989 OSHA 84.4 102.4
Asbestos occupational exposure limit 1986 OSHA 88.1 220.1
Arsenic occupational exposure limit 1978 OSHA 127.3 317.9
Asbestos ban 1989 EPA 131.8 329.2
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cattle-feed ban 1979 FDA 148.6 371.2
Benzene NESHAP (revised: waste opera-
tions) 1990 EPA 200.2 500.2
1,2-Dichloropropane in drinking water 1991 EPA 777.4 1,942.1
Hazardous waste land disposal ban 1988 EPA 4,988.7 12,462.7
Municipal solid waste landfills 1988 EPA 22,746.8 56,826.1
Formaldehyde occupational exposure
limit 1987 OSHA 102,622.8 256,372.7
Atrazine/alachlor in drinking water 1991 EPA 109,608.5 273,824.4
Hazardous waste listing for wood-
preserving chemicals 1990 EPA 6,785,822.0 16,952,364.9
SOURCE.-W. Kip Viscusi, Jahn K. Hakes, & Alan Carlin, Measures of Mortality Risks, 14 J. Risk &
Uncertainty 213, 228 (1997).
NOTE.-CPSC = Consumer Product Safety Commission; FAA = Federal Aviation Administration;
NHTSA = National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health
Administration; EPA = Environmental Protection Agency; FRA = Federal Railroad Administration;
MSHA = Mine Safety and Health Administration; FDA = Food and Drug Administration.
There are of course legitimate sources of heterogeneity, but agencies do
not recognize them. Consider first the influence of the income of the person
protected by the regulatory policy. More affluent individuals will have a
greater willingness to pay for protection from health hazards. This issue
arose with respect to a report I prepared for the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) in 1991. The average passenger on a U.S. airline in 1989 had
a median income level of $32,480, which is about 11/2 times the average
income level in a representative sample of workers in value-of-life studies
at that time and double or more the income levels of workers confined to
particularly high risk jobs. Should the FAA be permitted to use a higher
value of life for airline safety policy than the rest of the U.S. Department
of Transportation uses for valuing improved guard rails, automobile safety,
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and other matters? The rationale is that recognition of these income differ-
ences reflects the variations in individual willingness to pay for safety, with
the counterargument being that this discrepancy creates a form of inequity
in terms of the degree to which we are willing to protect people in different
income groups. Recognition of these differences leads to a comparably
higher willingness to pay for a statistical life saved through airline safety
as opposed to other programs of the U.S. Department of Transportation.
However, the FAA' s use of a higher value of life was not a transfer to more
affluent airline passengers. Mandating higher safety levels would boost air-
line costs and ticket prices. The Secretary of Transportation refused to rec-
ognize this heterogeneity that the FAA had sought and chose instead to treat
all lives symmetrically, irrespective of differences in willingness to pay.
This approach creates equity in terms of benefit valuation but in effect
serves as a form of income redistribution to people who do not value the
risk reduction policies as greatly.
The airline example becomes a bit more complicated if there is a mixture
of income groups on the plane. Suppose that half the passengers value their
lives at $8 million and half value their lives at $4 million. Use of an inter-
mediate value of $6 million will lead the poorer passengers to pay more for
safety than they would like and the richer passengers to buy less safety than
they like. The outcome is efficient on average, but unfortunately airline
safety policies do not permit recognition of such heterogeneity when all
passengers face identical risks. A situation in which people pay more for
safety than they might like individually is also not unique to this example.
The bulk of the regulations in Table 2 impose costs well beyond what peo-
ple would spend on these efforts if government officials chose policies re-
flecting their preferences instead of the excessive cost levels now being
imposed by regulatory efforts.
Recognition of heterogeneity in benefit values can often prevent clear-
cut inefficiencies. Suppose that public parking facilities are valued greatly
in urban areas, whereas improved erosion control is valued in rural areas.
Few would suggest that it is sensible to spend as much per capita on park-
ing structures in rural areas and that we spend the same amount on pre-
venting soil erosion in all locales. Rather, public policy efforts are targeted
where they benefit people to the greatest extent, where the value of these
benefits is the willingness to pay for the benefit that, in the case of risk
reduction policies, varies by income group.
An additional noteworthy feature of individual willingness to pay for risk
reductions is that there is heterogeneity according to the length of life at
risk. However, government agencies currently suppress this heterogeneity
and value all lives equally. Such symmetry is a form of risk equity in terms
of lives, but is one's remaining lifetime a sensible unit of measurement for
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equity? Current policies are not equitable with respect to the quantity of life
at risk.
Controlling for the discounted expected remaining life-years is a useful
measure to explore for lifesaving efforts, but it is not always compelling.
Does, for example, a person's value of life peak at birth, or does education
and training boost this value? Similarly, once many important lotteries of
life are resolved, such as those affecting income level or societal contribu-
tions, the value of life may be quite different. Examining longevity effects
is often instructive as policies benefiting people with only a few months to
live are less attractive than those benefiting similarly situated people with
greater lengths of life at risk.
Adjustments for the quantity of life often have a substantial influence.
The final column of Table 2 presents the cost per normalized life saved.
This normalization adjusts the lives lost to be equivalent in duration to the
fatalities resulting from accidents based on the discounted loss in life expec-
tancy. These efficacy numbers indicate that for health-oriented regulations,
such as those affecting cancer for which there is a substantial latency period
as well as less quantity of life saved when illnesses are prevented, there is
a substantial increase in the cost per life saved. The asbestos occupational
exposure limit in 1972, for example, had a cost per life saved of $9.9 mil-
lion, but once the estimates are adjusted for the quantity of life saved, the
cost rises to $24.7 million per accident equivalent life saved. This effect is
more general throughout the table as the cancer-reducing policies greatly
diminish in attractiveness compared to those preventing accidents.
The current practice of not making distinctions in terms of the kinds of
lives saved creates major risk inequities. Lifesaving policies extend lives
but do not confer immortality. The result is that efforts that save very little
in terms of life expectancy divert resources from programs that could have
a major life expectancy effect. A benefit-cost approach in which individual
heterogeneity is explicitly recognized in determining benefit levels would
prevent these inefficiencies, which are a form of inequity.
The principal counterargument to efficiency-based policy approaches is
that they will penalize minorities. Indeed, the most salient risk equity con-
cern has focused on environmental justice, which in turn has been stimu-
lated by claims that hazardous waste sites disproportionately harm minori-
ties. Whether this disproportionate harm actually occurs will be explored
below, but the principal issue with respect to risk equity as I have defined
it is not whether minorities face greater risk but whether they would fare
particularly badly under a benefit-cost regime.
To explore this issue, James Hamilton and Viscusi"8 examined the conse-
25 Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 26.
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TABLE 3
INTERACTION BETWEEN MINORITY POPULATION AND DIFFERENT
POLICY ANALYSIS ALTERNATIVES
MEAN MINORITY POPULATION (as % of Site
Population) IN ALL SITES WITH
MEAN MINORITY CLEANUP COSTS:
POPULATION Over $5 Million Over $5 Million
(as % of Site and Cost per and Cost per
Population) IN Cancer Case Cancer Case
ALL SITES IN Over $5 Averted under Averted under




Current policy' 17 18 32 26




Current policya 17 14 17 12
No ARARs' 17 15 34 13
SouRcE.-James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks? The Spatial and Political Dimen-
sions of Hazardous Waste Policy 234 (1999).
All sites in risk sample.
Sites with cumulative risks of at least 10
- 4. ARAR = applicable or relevant and appropriate state or
federal requirements.
quences of moving to a benefit-cost test for the cleanup of Superfund sites.
At present, the mean minority percentage at the sites remediated under cur-
rent policy practices is 17 percent. What would happen to the minority per-
centage if one applied a benefit-cost test requiring that the cost per case of
cancer averted not exceed $5 million for the cleanup to be justified? Ta-
ble 3 summarizes those policy consequences. For the reasonably significant
sites with cleanup costs greater than $5 million (and consequently at least
one expected case of cancer prevented if the site passes a benefit-cost test),
the mean minority percentage at the site ranges from 32 to 39 percent de-
pending on whether one recognizes other legislative constraints affecting
cleanup decisions. For the very inexpensive site cleanups with a cleanup
cost under $5 million, the mean minority percentage ranges from 17 to 34
percent. However, one obtains the low 17 percent figure only if one also
imposes the influence of cleanup requirements relating to other environ-
mental policies in the absence of a benefit-cost test. If one relied solely on
benefit-cost analysis without any other legislative or regulatory constraints,
the minority percentages affected by cleanup would be 39 percent for ex-
pensive cleanups and 34 percent for less expensive cleanups, where in each
case the minority percentage whose welfare is improved by the policy is at
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least twice as great as the minority percentage affected by current cleanup
actions. Note that with an inefficiently high cost per cancer case prevented
cutoff of $100 million, the minority percentage in Table 3 drops.
These results are not an aberration. They can be traced to two sets of
influences. First, what does in fact drive Superfund cleanup decisions is po-
litical power. Sites located in areas where there are influential populations
are targeted for more vigorous and more expensive cleanup efforts than are
areas with less political clout, which are disproportionately those where
there are larger minority populations. Reliance on a benefit-cost test conse-
quently equalizes the playing field across different population groups, en-
abling there to be true risk equity in terms of the cost per life saved rather
than having policies driven by political power.
A second set of factors contributing to the disadvantaged status of minor-
ities under current procedures is that a variety of risk equity notions have
crept into policy design and evaluation. Risk analysis procedures through-
out the federal government embody a variety of distortions that are all in-
tended to reflect a kind of risk equity, but that push away from a benefit-
cost norm and impose substantial losses on society, particularly on the
minority groups who are most likely to be harmed by hazardous exposures.
These influences will be explored below.
Minorities would benefit if policies gave benefits to that group the same
weight as benefits to the white population. In effect, they would have the
same willingness-to-pay value for benefits as nonminorities and conse-
quently receive the same weight. In a more refined policy regime, policy
makers might move beyond equalizing the cost per life saved across groups
and policies but instead recognize that the value of life increases with one's
income, lowering the benefit accorded to minorities. However, following
the airline safety example, one might recognize the role of income differ-
ences only if people receiving more benefits pay for these additional bene-
fits in some manner. This payment could be direct, as through airline ticket
prices, or could be through a higher overall tax bill. Moreover, consistent
with concerns arising with respect to Hicks-Kaldor compensation criteria,
one could assess the entire spectrum of policies and the payments groups
make toward government policies to assess their overall equity. In the ab-
sence of such distinctions, application of a uniform value of life will serve
as an implicit form of income redistribution.
IV. ALTERNATIVE RiSK EQUITY MEASURES
Absolute Risk Levels
If one were to envision a risk-based measure of risk equity, perhaps the
most natural measure would be the absolute risk that a person faced. Thus,
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for any given age level one would focus on the mortality risk. Taking a
broader perspective in recognizing the effect of different activities on one's
distribution of mortality risks over the lifetime, one might focus on one's
incremental mortality risk at different ages or the total effect on life expec-
tancy.
Cigarette smokers are certainly on the high end in terms of their current
absolute risk levels. Smoking cigarettes imposes a lifetime risk of prema-
ture mortality from smoking of 0.18-0.36, and it shortens one's life expec-
tancy by 3.6-7.2 years.29 What would be the effect of recognizing that
smokers already have very high risks to their lives from their smoking ac-
tivity? Should these groups be given preference with respect to hazardous
waste cleanup, job safety, and other practices? Alternatively, are we neces-
sarily required to reduce smokers' risks to those of nonsmokers in a pursuit
of risk equity? Must we ban smoking? If the latter prohibition is mandated,
does it also extend to banning high-fat foods, mandating a daily exercise
regimen, and driving large, crashworthy cars? Similarly, should we always
give priority in risk regulation policies to those who live in high-crime areas
because their residential exposures put them at the upper end of the per-
sonal risk spectrum?
Risk regulation policies have largely been unconcerned with absolute risk
levels. The base mortality risk level of populations at risk seldom arises as
a concern at all. What policy makers focus on instead is the incremental risk
from a particular source of risk, whether it be the environment or hazardous
products. Any meaningful notion of risk equity, however, presumably
should be grounded in the absolute risk level of the individual rather than
focusing on incremental risks since otherwise there will be clear-cut inequi-
ties in what is of consequence to people's lives, which is the total risk they
face.
That having been said, it would not be wise to interfere with informed
private choices to bear risk. The appropriate policy objective is maximiza-
tion of expected individual welfare, not risk minimization. Ultimately, a
concern with risk levels alone as the policy objective will divert attention
from more fundamental welfare principles and lead to interference with
economic decisions that should be unconstrained.
Incremental Risk Levels
The policy focus with respect to risk equity is almost invariably on the
incremental risk associated with a particular risk exposure. In some in-
29 For supporting data see W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision 70, 80
(1992).
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stances, the emphasis is not even on a particular class of activities (for ex-
ample, all pollution exposures) but rather on a specific source of risk (for
example, risks from a single emissions source). While absolute risks may
be a more sensible concern if risk-level equity is the policy objective, in
practice it is particular incremental risks that drive policy.
Suppose our objective is to equalize risks from different sources so that
we all face the same risks from consumer products, jobs, and types of envi-
ronmental risks. Is this in fact feasible? Floods are more likely to affect the
eastern states, with the most severe tallies of flood deaths over the past 2
decades being in the Appalachians, mid-Atlantic, Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, Virginia, and northeast areas.3" Do we really want to equalize the
floods risk in these states with that faced by residents in arid states such as
Arizona? Similarly, heat wave deaths in Chicago hold the fatality record,
but would we want Chicago residents to face the same risk of death from
heat waves as do people residing in Jackson Hole, Wyoming?3 Hurricanes
are much more likely to threaten residents on the Atlantic Coast, particu-
larly in the southeast, than they are to affect the population of Kansas,
which is more susceptible to tornadoes.32
Attempts to equalize the risk from different sources are no more sensible
than trying to equalize these incremental risks from classes of natural disas-
ters. The reason why it is not sensible to equalize risks from natural disas-
ters any more than it is to equalize the risks from air pollution, hazardous
waste, or job risks across different occupations is that there are different
costs to reducing risk to low levels in these different contexts. Ultimately,
any plausible objective for government policy must incorporate both costs
as well as what is delivered for these costs, which are the risk reductions
or the benefits achieved.
Focusing on incremental risks as the equity norm takes on additional irra-
tionalities with respect to specific misguided notions of risk equity that have
arisen. Within EPA hazardous cleanup efforts, the focus is on individual
risks rather than population risks. Thus, any actual or hypothetical individ-
ual risk exposure to a cancer risk of at least one chance in 10,000 requires
mandatory cleanup of the risk, and the agency has discretion to mandate a
cleanup for risks up to a lifetime risk level of one in a million. The focus
on individual risks rather than population risks stems from the risk equity
notion that no particular individual should be exposed to an incremental
lifetime risk exceeding a particular amount, in this case one in 10,000. What
this seemingly innocuous risk equity requirement does is drastically distort
30 These statistics on flood deaths are from National Safety Council, supra note 9, at 22.
3' In 1995, 465 people died in a heat wave in Chicago. See id.
32 For documentation, see The Wizard of Oz (1939).
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policy practices. Risks where there is some potential hypothetical future ex-
posure, which may or may not materialize, receive the same policy weight
as do current risks to large populations. Indeed, under current policy prac-
tices the EPA does not even consider the size of the exposed populations.
Moreover, empirically the population density has no statistically significant
effect on Superfund cleanups.33
We are consequently faced with anomalies where EPA is mandating am-
bitious cleanups such as that noted by Justice Stephen Breyer:
Let me provide some examples. The first comes from a case in my own court,
United States v. Ottati & Goss, arising out of a ten-year effort to force cleanup of
a toxic waste dump in southern New Hampshire. The site was mostly cleaned up.
All but one of the private parties had settled. The remaining private party litigated
the cost of cleaning up the last little bit, a cost of about $9.3 million to remove a
small amount of highly diluted PCBs and "volatile organic compounds" (benzene
and gasoline components) by incinerating the dirt. How much extra safety did this
$9.3 million buy? The forty-thousand-page record of this ten-year effort indicated
(and all the parties seemed to agree) that, without the extra expenditure, the waste
dump was clean enough for children playing on the site to eat small amounts of
dirt daily for 70 days each year without significant harm. Burning the soil would
have made it clean enough for the children to eat small amounts daily for 245 days
per year without significant harm. But there were no dirt-eating children playing in
the area, for it was a swamp. Nor were dirt-eating children likely to appear there,
for future building seemed unlikely. The parties also agreed that at least half of the
volatile organic chemicals would likely evaporate by the year 2000. To spend $9.3
million to protect non-existent dirt-eating children is what I mean by the problem
of "the last 10 percent.''
3 4
Justice Breyer's experiences are not an outlier, as Superfund cleanup ef-
forts are not grounded in protecting populations but in reducing individual
risks, hypothetical or real. Risk equity in terms of reducing individual risks
is the guiding principle, not total risk reduction benefits or benefit-cost
trade-offs. This practice disproportionally harms minority populations. Mi-
norities are particularly likely to be densely concentrated around hazardous
waste sites. Indeed, for sites in which there are risks to existing populations
from current risk exposures, 45 percent of the population within one-quarter
of a mile of Superfund sites are minorities. Indeed, the main source of risk
inequity to minorities is not that there are more hazardous waste sites lo-
cated in minority neighborhoods. In fact, the average white population lo-
cated within 1 mile of the Superfund site is actually greater than for minori-
3 These and other descriptions of the operation of the Superfund program are based on
the empirical analysis in Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 26.
4 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
11-12 (1993).
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ties. In particular, the average white population figure across all Superfund
sites on the National Priorities List is 86 percent, which exceeds the minor-
ity population percentage of 80 percent.35 However, when minorities are
present they are often present in much greater numbers and are concentrated
either directly on-site or particularly close to the Superfund sites. Somewhat
incredulously, the EPA completely ignores the magnitudes of the popula-
tion exposed and the total number of cancer cases to be prevented by any
hazardous waste cleanup. It focuses instead on the risk equity concept of
individual risks, which disadvantages existing populations who receive no
weight for their greater numbers and no weight for the fact that these risk
exposures now exist. Hypothetical risk exposures that may never exist and
that are never discounted to present value receive the same weight as do
current real risks. These individual risk equity practices consequently serve
as one of the contributors to the neglect of minorities under current prac-
tices that nominally preach a commitment to environmental equity.
There is also inconsistency in terms of how the incremental risk levels
are handled in reference to the policy targets. Suppose that a risk meeting
the one in 10,000 lifetime risk is the trigger for cleanup. As part of the
cleanup, the EPA may mandate extremely stringent policy options that re-
duce the postremediation risk to 10-8 or 10- 9. However, the result is that
the postcleanup level of the risk will be much lower than the risk threshold
of 10-6, which the EPA has set as a cutoff where cleanup should not be
pursued. If in fact risks greater than 10- 4 require cleanup, risks between
10- ' and 10-6 can potentially be targets for cleanup, and risks smaller than
10-6 should never be addressed by EPA cleanup, will there not be substan-
tial inequities created in terms of the incremental risk by reducing the risk
level at sites receiving cleanup to levels 100 or 1,000 times safer than the
risk cutoff at which the EPA stipulates that no cleanup should be under-
taken? Quite simply, these individual risk policy guidelines that purport to
be a form of risk equity are not a sensible basis for policy.
The concern with equity for hypothetical future generations of risk expo-
sures becomes particularly problematic with respect to risks far into the dis-
tant future.36 Recent studies of the storage of nuclear wastes indicate that
there could be corrosive effects on the buried wastes beginning in the year
102,010, with potentially significant radioactive exposures for nearby farm-
ers in the year 312,010.17 Should risks at least 100,000 years from now
31 See Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 26, at 168.
36 These issues are explored in detail by John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Popula-
tion, in this issue, at 953.
" For supporting discussion, see John Christensen, New Questions Plague Nuclear Waste
Storage Plan, N.Y. Times, August 10, 1999, at Dl, D4.
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merit the same concern as risks to current populations? As a policy matter,
some federal agencies such as the EPA do not discount risk effects to pres-
ent value so that deferred influences matter as much as current effects.
From an economic standpoint, discounting is warranted because what is be-
ing discounted is society's willingness to pay for the benefits, not deaths.
Coupling this lack of discounting with a practice of ignoring the size of
populations affected creates a preposterous basis for policy in which the
potential of future technologies to reduce these risks becomes less conse-
quential than our current risk conservatism.
If our concern with incremental risk equity is real, should we not also
have the same concerns across countries as well? Indeed, there have been
some proposals espoused by labor unions and other groups that the United
States not import any goods produced in a manner that does not conform
with U.S. job safety and environmental standards and that the Unites States
not export any goods that do not meet U.S. safety standards.38
Such notions of risk equity will engender substantial inefficiencies. Less
developed countries have much lower income levels than in the United
States, so that forcing them to adhere to U.S. safety and environmental
practices will make these societies worse off, with their attendant adverse
mortality effects. Is it, for example, realistic to require that China comply
with current U.S. environmental pollution standards and that manufacturing
production in Africa and Indonesia adhere to U.S. safety standards? It is
only because of our greater affluence that we have been able to afford such
efforts, as the preference for risk reduction increases substantially with soci-
etal income. Banning the import of these goods is little more than a form
of disguised protectionism, as the main force that will promote economic
well-being and ultimately the health of less developed countries will be in-
ternational trade rather than embargoes on their products if they do not meet
our lofty risk and environmental standards.
The prohibition of exports of hazardous goods is likewise ill conceived,
except perhaps for situations in which there will be considerable mispercep-
tions arising from goods made by U.S. companies that do not in fact meet
U.S. safety standards. Requirements that U.S. exports meet U.S. safety stan-
dards create economic harms to U.S. workers. A salient case where these
practices have been of concern is with respect to pharmaceutical products.
Many drugs are approved for use in western Europe before approval is
given in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). By
not permitting firms to manufacture and export goods that do not meet U.S.
pharmaceutical safety requirements, the restrictions in effect force these op-
3 For an academic advocacy of this position, see Nicolas Askounes Ashford, Crisis in the
Workplace: Occupational Disease and Injury (1976).
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erations overseas. Other countries with different medical establishments and
different criteria for approval might legitimately choose to permit the use
of the drug in that country even though it has not been approved by the
FDA. Indeed, even with the United States there has been a long-standing
complaint about the drug approval lag times. Policy efforts periodically at-
tempt to accelerate drug approval times in recognition of the often tardy
process by which lifesaving drugs reach the market.
Actual versus Perceived Risks
In promoting risk equity, should our concern be with the risks that people
actually face or the risks that people perceive that they face? Put somewhat
differently, should we equalize the mortality risk to individuals or their
fears of these mortality risks? Let me make my biases clear at the outset.
The objective of government policy in my view should be to reduce objec-
tive risks to populations and to generate actual improvements in health
rather than foster illusory increases in well-being.
Policy discussions with respect to protecting populations, particularly
with respect to hazardous waste exposures, often suggest that the emphasis
should be on perceived risks rather than real risks. It is fear of hazardous
waste that drives these programs, as hazards from chemical wastes rank first
in the public's concerns for environmental risks even though the actual risks
are quite small in most instances.
Suppose that the government had a choice between equally costing pol-
icy options for cleaning up wastes in two different towns. In Happyville
there are no actual cases of cancer to be prevented but people believe that
100 cases would be prevented through a hazardous waste cleanup. In Bliss-
ville, people are completely ignorant of any risks, but hazardous waste
cleanup efforts will reduce 100 cases of cancer. If cleanup efforts in each
town have the same cost and if we could cleanup only one of the sites,
which should we pick? Some scholars suggest that the choice is not clear-
cut.39
The example discussed above is based on one that I developed as part of
an exchange I had with Paul Portney on a panel at the American Economic
Association meetings. Portney's example is Happyville, and my counter-
example was Blissville. Current policy practices would support cleanup of
Happyville. In my view, failure to clean up Blissville is a form of statistical
murder in which lives are sacrificed to focus instead on illusory fears.
Proponents of promoting risk equity through addressing perceived risks
" See, in particular, Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt.
131 (1992).
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rather than actual risks often defend their position by suggesting that in a
democratic society the government should be responsive to the preferences
of the citizenry. However, if these preferences stem from erroneous proba-
bilistic beliefs, then they should be overridden. For much the same reason
that we intervene when people underestimate the risk and buy products that
are overly dangerous, we should also not succumb to irrational political
pressures that lead us to institutionalize private irrationalities.
Current policies are affected by a curious asymmetry. If people underesti-
mate the risk, policy makers rush to intervene to alleviate the market fail-
ure. If people overestimate the risk, creating pressures for wasteful inter-
ventions, policy makers defend their interventionist zeal by claiming that in
a democracy citizen preferences must be respected. However, what is at
stake is not preferences or the shape of individual utility functions. What is
at issue is the underlying probabilistic beliefs that may be quite erroneous
and should not receive deference when designing policies.
Is there nevertheless some set of circumstances in which the government
should intervene, such as when alarmist responses to risk depress property
values? In many instances all that is at stake is transfers across parties.
Property owners will be made better off if a hazardous waste cleanup elimi-
nates a feared, but nonexistent, risk. All that should count from an effi-
ciency standpoint is the attendant efficiency loss from failing to develop the
land to its best use.
Risk Characteristics
Often the policy concern is not with the overall risk or even the incre-
mental risk but rather with the type of the risk. Thus, the risk equity notion
is that there should be limits on particular classes of risks. The differing
treatment of synthetic and natural chemicals is symptomatic of this concern
with risk characteristics
°.4
Are synthetic chemicals in fact more dangerous? While some may be, as
a general rule synthetic chemicals are not necessarily more dangerous. An
examination of a large sample of 365 chemicals indicates that synthetic
chemicals pose a lower risk as measured by the TD50 value, which is the
amount of the chemical needed before 50 percent of the rats in the sample
develop tumors as a result of exposure. Other measures of the carcinogenic-
ity of synthetic and natural chemicals for the sample of 365 chemicals yield
similar results. However, synthetic chemicals are much more likely to be
regulated, particularly by the FDA. The nature of this bias stems from the
bias against novel risks created by synthetic chemicals as opposed to ex-
' The data to be described below are drawn from Viscusi, supra note 22, at 86-88.
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isting risks posed by natural chemicals. No measure of risk potency ac-
counts for the differential regulatory bias, as the underlying risk equity con-
cept driving policy is not even to equalize the risk in any meaningful sense
but rather to eliminate the class of risks associated with synthetic chemicals.
Similar kinds of biases seem to arise with respect to health versus safety
risks. As the data in Table 2 indicate, the cost per life saved is especially
great for cancer reduction policies, where this bias is particularly strong
once one adjusts for the length of life lost. To the extent that accidents are
more familiar and often involve an element of volition, whereas the health
outcomes are much more mysterious in terms of their cause, there may be
a form of irrationality that creates pressures for health risk regulation. The
relative inadequacy of market forces alone cannot explain this differential
emphasis since one would be able to reduce health risks more cost effec-
tively than safety risks if markets were more prone to failure for health haz-
ards, which they may well be.
Another class of risks that has merited particular policy attention is with
respect to involuntary risks as compared to voluntary risks. As noted in the
discussion of market behavior, the self-selection of people into voluntary
risks will lead the mix of individuals exposed to these risks to have a lower
value of life. These values affect willingness-to-pay values and hence total
benefit estimates. Some might suggest that we would go beyond these
efficiency-related effects and place additional emphasis on eliminating in-
voluntary risks. The stringent controls emerging throughout the country to
limit exposures to environmental tobacco smoke indicate the substantial
concern with involuntary risks as compared to risks that we knowingly in-
cur. Voluntary risks have the additional advantage of providing some com-
pensatory benefit, such as wages for a risky job, whereas involuntary risks
do not. Striking an appropriate balance between the welfare of those af-
fected by involuntary risks and the welfare of those who will be harmed by
regulating such risks can be achieved by treating these effects symmetri-
cally using benefit-cost analysis. Current policy practices often view the
prevention of involuntary risks as a trump card that should dominate all
other policy concerns.
V. THE COSTS OF RISK EQUITY
The efficiency norm that serves as the point of departure for risk equity
concerns can take on several different levels of refinement. At the most ba-
sic level one could equalize the marginal cost per life saved across different
policies. People exposed to various sources of risk in different contexts
would receive the same weight, unlike the current regime in which agencies
differ quite starkly in the stringency of their risk regulations.
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The first level of refinement would be to recognize that policies to extend
life have quite different effects based on the quantity and quality of life at
risk. While much remains to be done in refining these economic valuations,
evaluating the cost per discounted life-year of policies would provide an
index of some of the more salient policy concerns. The current approach of
ignoring length-of-life issues creates inequities by valuing the life of a per-
son with advanced respiratory disease and a 6-month life expectancy the
same as a healthy person with a 40-year life expectancy.
Recognition of differences in willingness to pay based on income and
attitudes toward risk would be the next level of refinement. Such recogni-
tion of heterogeneity in values might be most readily accepted in contexts
for which there was an actual transaction in which the beneficiaries of the
regulation pay for the benefits they receive. The closer the regulatory con-
text can simulate a market structure, the more easily one can use a market
efficiency reference point. If there is no payment extracted and some groups
with high willingness to pay benefit disproportionately, the policy challenge
is to ensure that the entire package of policies and taxes is equitable.
Risk equity as achieved through the operation of voluntary transactions
in competitive markets leads to efficient safety levels as well as compensa-
tion of those bearing the risk. Hazard warnings that foster such market oper-
ations consequently rank very high in terms of their promotion of risk eq-
uity. More general regulatory policies grounded in benefit-cost criteria also
achieve efficient levels of the risk and can recognize the kinds of diverse
concerns to the economic benefits achieved by markets, including factors
such as the heterogeneity in individual riskiness and differences in attitudes
toward risk, as well as differences to the length of life that is at risk.
Even a simplified benefit-cost norm that abstracts from individual varia-
tions in willingness to pay is a more compelling equity rationale than that
currently advocated under the guise of environmental equity. The efficiency
norm is to equalize the marginal cost per life saved across all efforts, ad-
justing for factors such as the quantity of life at risk. All lives count equally.
Moreover, lives saved by job safety policies count the same as those saved
through safer highways or decreased pollution. People harmed by risks
from a particular source would not receive differential policy emphasis, as
they do now. The equity measure I advocate is to equalize benefit-cost
trade-offs, not just risk levels. The cost-effectiveness equity measure recog-
nizes that risk policies involve both benefits and costs. Current equity prac-
tices ignore costs altogether. Instead, they seek to equalize incremental
risks, perceived risks, potential individual risks, or some other risk-based
measure.
Analysis of the consequences of using benefit-cost tests for choosing haz-
ardous waste site cleanups indicates that the trade-off between efficiency
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and equity is in fact a false dichotomy. Minorities would fare much better
under a benefit-cost regime than under the current EPA cleanup policy strat-
egy, which purports to advance environmental equity. Notwithstanding the
agency's politically correct declarations, the driving force behind hazardous
waste cleanup is the political clout of the affected populations. The power-
less, the disenfranchised, and the less politically sophisticated fare much
worse under the current regime than they would if policy choices were
driven by evaluation of policy benefits and costs. Benefit-cost analysis
equalizes the political playing field so that what has merit is the risk conse-
quences of the policy, not the political power of those affected. Benefit-cost
tests in effect endow minorities with equal standing that they do not other-
wise have within the context of our current regime of politically driven risk
regulation policies.
Notions of risk equity that permeate the federal regulatory regime include
more than just an avowed concern with the well-being of minorities. For
example, there are also efforts to ensure that no particular individual is ex-
posed to too high a level of risk from a particular type of risk exposure.
Equity in the sense of constraining risks not to be too great would seem to
be an innocuous requirement. However, the policy emphasis on individual
risks, many of which are hypothetical risks to speculative future popula-
tions, diverts our risk regulation resources away from actual risks to large
populations. Since minorities tend to be more densely concentrated in more
polluted areas, this policy emphasis creates a discriminatory bias against
minorities.
More generally, exploration of the various risk equity concepts suggests
that there is no salient risk equity measure to serve as a meaningful refer-
ence point. There is almost always some notion of risk equity that can be
expounded to justify worthless risk regulations. We purportedly need to
spend these funds to protect minorities, to ensure that farmers or those in
high-risk locales are not at risk, or to eliminate the unfairness of involuntary
risks. Ad hoe equity justifications can always be mustered because unlike
efficiency norms there is no well-defined equity standard.
Consideration of a variety of risk equity approaches that are embodied
in risk regulation policies suggests that there are often huge inefficiencies
accompanying such misguided equity norms, the extent of which are re-
flected in the $6 billion median cost per case of cancer averted through haz-
ardous waste cleanup efforts, which do not even advance the interests of
minorities. More generally, almost all job safety and environmental policies
have squandered our economic resources. The price that we pay for our eq-
uity illusions is thousands of lives that could be saved by basing regulatory
policies on efficiency norms.
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